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Cyber-Takings: The War on Crime Moves into the Cloud 
Larry McIntyre 
[P]rocedural devices rooted in experience were written 
into the Bill of Rights not as abstract rubrics in an 
elegant code but in order to assure fairness and justice 
before any person could be deprived of “life, liberty, or 
property.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent advances in the reliability and availability of broadband Internet 
connections have allowed technology users to store vast amounts of data remotely.2 
Cloud services now commonly sync photos, videos, emails, contacts, and other 
documents across multiple devices. Our craving for ubiquitous access to data, 
however, is not without limitation. At the forefront of the debate surrounding these 
services are concerns about privacy and security.3 The thought of a third party 
gaining access to our private data is understandably troubling. Yet, these concerns 
frequently overlook the possibility that our digital life may become collateral 
damage in the course of a criminal investigation. Such digital asset seizures are 
becoming increasingly prevalent4 as the Obama administration increases its use of 
existing civil forfeiture laws in an effort to deter cybercrime.5 
Part I of this article discusses the scope of the federal government’s asset 
forfeiture authority under various statutes, and examines the social and political 
                                                          
 Larry McIntyre is a J.D. candidate at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2015. 
1 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276 (1942). 
2 Quentin Hardy, Big Data Picks Up the Pace, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 5, 2014, http://bits.blogs 
.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/big-data-picks-up-the-pace/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
3 See, e.g., Rosa Golijan, Is your cloud drive really private? Not according to fine print, NBC 
NEWS (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/your-cloud-drive-really-private-not-
according-fine-print-f1C8881731. 
4 See Nate Anderson, “Crime is Crime”: Meet the Internet Police, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 21, 2011, 
5:01 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/01/crime-is-crime-meet-the-internet-police. 
5 Exec. Office of the President, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing 
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context leading to their enactment. Part II examines the Prioritizing Resources and 
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (PRO-IP Act),6 a federal statute, 
which increases both civil and criminal penalties for copyright infringement.7 Part 
III analyzes two notable criminal prosecutions, and distinguishes them from cases 
that do not involve digital assets.8 Part IV argues government seizures of digital 
assets may implicate the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause. Finally, Part V 
concludes by finding that digital asset forfeitures constitute Fifth Amendment 
takings. 
I. FEDERAL FORFEITURE 
Asset forfeiture laws allow the government to permanently deprive an owner 
of his or her property rights when either the property itself has been used as “an 
instrumentality of crime,” or “the owner of the property has been involved in a 
criminal activity.”9 Forfeiture is a method by which the government can, without 
compensation, take title to, or possession over property that has been tainted by a 
crime.10 During civil asset forfeitures, this process may take place entirely outside 
of or without a criminal prosecution.11 
Civil asset forfeitures operate in rem and are based upon a theory that the 
property itself is guilty of wrongdoing.12 Accordingly, the civil forfeiture has 
become a powerful tool for law enforcement agencies and allows the government 
to take private property without paying compensation, but does not 
correspondingly impose the burden of proving an owner’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.13 In the United States, no single statute grants the government 
general authority to seek civil forfeiture of property gained from, or otherwise 
                                                          
6 Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 
U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.). 
7 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012). 
8 Indictment, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12CR3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012); Sealed Complaint, 
United States v. Ulbricht, No. 13 Mag. 2328 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013). 
9 Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 453–55 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
10 Stefan D. Cassella, Overview of Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, 55 U.S. ATT’Y 
BULL. 8, 8 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5506.pdf. 
11 In contrast, criminal forfeiture proceedings generally occur during the sentencing phase of a 
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involved in, the commission of crime.14 Instead, statutes for specific criminal 
offenses must allow for asset forfeitures.15 
A. Our Turbulent History of Zero Tolerance 
In his first State of the Union address, Richard Nixon famously promised to 
win the “war against crime.”16 The President called on Congress to pass legislation 
that would give law enforcement agencies “new and stronger weapons” to 
eliminate street-level crime.17 Later that year, Congress enacted the first federal 
statutes to specifically include asset forfeiture provisions.18 The first of these 
statutes, the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act of 1970 (hereinafter 
“RICO”) allows for forfeiture of assets connected to racketeering and organized 
crime.19 The second statute, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970 (hereinafter the “CDAPCA”), permits forfeiture of assets 
connected to violations of the Controlled Substances Act.20 State enactment of 
comparable statutes soon followed.21 Nixon’s vehement rhetoric continued to 
intensify until his presidency came to an abrupt conclusion in 1974.22 
Just eight years after its enactment, the CDAPCA was amended to include 
broader categories of property that could be forfeited to the government.23 Through 
this Amendment, Congress gave federal law enforcement officers the power to seek 
forfeiture of: “all moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of 
                                                          
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Richard Nixon: Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, UCSB, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2921 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
17 Id. 
18 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970); 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (CDAPCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 
(2012). 
19 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1970). 
20 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (CDAPCA), 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 801–971 (2012). 
21 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6801–6802 (2012). 
22 At one point, Nixon brazenly designated drug abuse as “America’s public enemy number one.” 
See Richard Nixon: Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, 
UCSB, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3047#axzz1PCJydjl5 (last visited Feb. 18, 
2014). 
23 Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 3301, 92 Stat. 3768 (codified at 21 
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value.”24 The CDAPCA, which was further amended in 1984,25 presently allows 
for forfeiture of virtually all categories of private property.26 
B. Use and Abuse 
The list of reported abuses of this formidable tool is far too lengthy to detail 
fully.27 Some of the more notable stories are, nevertheless, illustrative. One recent 
example occurred in Texas, when Jennifer Boatright was taken into custody, along 
with her two sons, while on the way to purchase a used car.28 According to police, 
Boatright, a Latina, fit the profile of a drug courier.29 Although no drugs were 
found in the vehicle, the local district attorney presented Boatright with two 
options, she could be prosecuted for money laundering and child endangerment, or 
she could agree to forfeit the cash officers had found in her vehicle.30 Boatright 
signed her hard-earned savings over to the city, and in return no criminal charges 
were filed.31 In another comparable example from a case in Philadelphia, police 
sought forfeiture of the home of Mary and Leon Adams after their adult son was 
accused of selling $20 worth of marijuana to a confidential informant on the 
couple’s front porch.32 Stories like these share one commonality, the displacement 
of traditional principles of due process, which are fundamental to the American 
justice system. 
In response to widespread criticism of civil asset forfeitures, Congress passed 
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (hereinafter “CAFRA”).33 CAFRA 
prevents government agents from forfeiting assets on the basis of probable cause.34 
Under CAFRA, before the government is permitted to seize assets, the government 
must specifically demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that there is a 
                                                          
24 Id. 
25 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
26 See 21 U.S.C. § U881(a)(1)–(11) (2012). 
27 See Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
reporting/2013/08/12/130812fa_fact_stillman. See also Isaiah Thompson, Law to Clean Up ‘Nuisances’ 
Costs Innocent People Their Homes, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 5, 2013, 5:39 AM), http://www.propublica.org/ 
article/law-to-clean-up-nuisances-costs-innocent-people-their-homes. 
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substantial connection between the crime and the property.35 CAFRA also 
authorizes the appointment of counsel for any person who has standing to contest a 
civil forfeiture, but who is unable to afford private representation.36 
Perhaps the most important reform within CAFRA, is the creation of an 
innocent owner defense.37 When the innocent owner defense, which is an 
affirmative defense, is applicable, an innocent third party’s ownership interest in 
property will not be forfeited.38 The burden is on the innocent party to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he or she either (1) “did not know of the 
conduct giving rise to forfeiture,” or (2) “did all that reasonably could be expected 
under the circumstances to terminate such use of the property.”39 Courts are split in 
their application of this defense, which often requires a largely subjective 
“reasonableness” determination.40 As a result, over 80% of all forfeitures still go 
uncontested even after CAFRA’s enactment.41 In fact, as demonstrated by Jennifer 
Boatright’s, many innocent individuals often refrain from challenging a forfeiture 
because they are afraid doing so will lead to criminal charges.42 
Even though CAFRA provides individuals with a way to challenge forfeitures 
federally, CAFRA does nothing to inhibit individual states from engaging in civil 
asset forfeitures.43 States are therefore permitted to enact their own forfeiture laws, 
which can be either more stringent or more lenient than CAFRA. In Pennsylvania, 
for example, asset forfeiture laws are comparable to their federal counterparts and 
do not provide any more leniency in asset forfeiture.44 When grading states’ 
forfeiture laws, the Institute for Justice specifically gave the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania a “D.”45 This grade came in large part from the fact that even though 
                                                          
35 See id. § 983(c) (2012). 
36 Id. § 983(b)(1). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012). 
38 Id. § 983(d)(1). 
39 Id. § 983(d)(2). 
40 See generally Cassella, supra note 10. 
41 Id. at 12, 72 (explaining that contested civil forfeitures “provide the government with greater 
discovery tools and afford the government a right to depose and otherwise take broad civil discovery.”). 
42 See 18 U.S.C. § 1983(a)(3) (2012) (explaining that when an administrative forfeiture is 
contested the government may either bring a civil forfeiture or a criminal forfeiture). 
43 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012). 
44 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6801–6802 (2012). 
45 Asset Forfeiture Report: Pennsylvania, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/asset-
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Pennsylvania’s statute provides an all-encompassing grant of authority for asset 
forfeiture, some trial courts have shown principled restraint in engaging in 
forfeitures, while some police officials have not.46 Allegheny County trial courts, 
for instance, exercised sufficient restraint whereby the policy was “we had to have 
a [criminal] conviction and it had to make some reasonable sense why we were 
going after forfeiture.”47 Alternatively, police departments such as the Pittsburgh 
Police have exceeded the encompassing grant of authority involving asset 
forfeitures.48 Recent audits have revealed that the Pittsburgh Police Department has 
routinely failed to comply with the statutory requirement that forfeiture funds be 
used only for narcotics-related investigations.49 This evidenced by one particularly 
egregious instance where in 2009, the Pittsburgh Police Department spent 
approximately $10,000 of forfeited funds on Gatorade.50 Similarly, over $4,000 of 
forfeited funds were used to send three bureau employees to Miami in 2012.51 
II. FORFEITURE OF DIGITAL ASSETS 
On October 13, 2008, George W. Bush signed the Prioritizing Resources and 
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (hereinafter “the PRO-IP 
Act”).52 Content rights-holders such as the Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”) and the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”) 
staunchly supported the legislation.53 The PRO-IP Act amended existing copyright 
law to specifically include civil and criminal forfeiture provisions.54 Under the 
PRO-IP Act, the Department of Justice’s forfeiture authority may be invoked when 
                                                                                                                                      
Machine, PHILADELPHIA CITY PAPER (Nov. 28, 2012), http://citypaper.net/article.php?The-Cash-
Machine-19189 (explaining that “[a]s the role of forfeiture in Pennsylvania expanded [Allegheny] 
county’s president judge ordered that forfeitures involving criminal matters be handled in criminal 
court”). 
46 Thompson, supra note 27. 
47 Id. 
48 Liz Navratil, Pittsburgh police misuse of drug fund cited, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, 





52 Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 
U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.). 
53 See Nate Anderson, Big Content gloats as Bush signs PRO-IP Act, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 14, 
2008, 2:48 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2008/10/bush-signs-pro-ip-act-big-content-gloats. 
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the underlying crime is one of copyright infringement, trademark infringement, or 
misappropriation of trade secrets.55 
The PRO-IP Act specifically allows for civil forfeiture of (1) any prohibited 
articles, (2) property used or intended to be used “to commit or facilitate the 
commission of an offense,” and (3) “[a]ny property constituting or derived from 
any proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the commission of an 
offense referred to in subparagraph (A).”56 The PRO-IP Act’s forfeiture provision, 
however, was not a unique creation of the legislature. Rather, PRO-IP Act 
incorporated the statutory language used in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (including subsequent amendments) by 
reference.57 
Armed with this new enforcement authority, a newly-created IP task force 
within the Department of Homeland Security got to work seizing website domain 
names.58 On June 30, 2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
unveiled a new program to respond to counterfeiting and piracy on the Internet.59 
The program began with the seizure of ten websites, which were distributing newly 
released movies.60 As time passed, the government’s appetite for seizing domain 
names swelled. “Operation Fake Sweep” yielded the seizure of 307 websites that 
had allegedly distributed counterfeit NFL merchandise.61 “Project Bitter Pill” led to 
the seizure of 686 websites purportedly selling counterfeit medications.62 By 
December 2013, 2,550 domain names had been seized since the program’s 
                                                          
55 Id. § 2323(a)(1). 
56 Id. § 2323(a)(1)(A)–(C) (referring to the offenses of criminal copyright infringement, 
trafficking in counterfeit goods, and the unauthorized recording of Motion pictures). 
57 See id. § 2323(a)(2) (“The provisions of chapter 46 relating to civil forfeitures shall extend to 
any seizure or civil forfeiture under this section.”); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (2012) (incorporating by 
reference the procedures from 18 U.S.C. § 8981(b)). 
58 See, e.g., OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Department of Justice Seizes 
More than $896,000 in Proceeds from the Online Sale of Counterfeit Sports Apparel (Apr. 10, 2012), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-crm-447.html (discussing investigation and 
seizure of domain names engaged in sale of counterfeit goods). 
59“Operation In Our Sites” targets Internet movie pirates, ICE, http://www.ice.gov/news/ 
releases/1006/100630losangeles.htm (last modified June 30, 2010). 
60 Id. 
61 Special agents and officers seize more than $4.8 million in fake NFL merchandise and seize 
307 websites during ‘Operation Fake Sweep,’ ICE, https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1202/ 
120202indianapolis.htm (last modified Feb. 2, 2012). 
62 HSI seizes 686 websites selling counterfeit medicine to unsuspecting consumers, ICE, 
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introduction 41 months earlier.63 These seizures, however, were only the tip of the 
iceberg. 
III. CHAOS IN THE COURTS 
A. Megaupload.com 
On January 19, 2012, Megaupload, one of the most popular file-sharing 
services on the Internet was shut down by the United States Department of 
Justice.64 The FBI, working in tandem with various international agencies, 
executed more than twenty search warrants across nine countries throughout the 
investigation.65 Megaupload’s servers were seized along with eighteen associated 
domain names and approximately $50 million in assets.66 According to the 
subsequently unsealed grand jury indictment, the government sought forfeiture of 
among other things a Lamborghini LM002, a Rolls-Royce Phantom, a Maserati 
GranCabrio, 60 Dell servers, and dozens of international bank accounts.67 Each of 
the seven defendants, including the aptly named CEO Kim Dotcom, were charged 
with conspiracy to commit racketeering, conspiracy to commit copyright 
infringement, and two counts of criminal copyright infringement.68 Because 
copyright infringement is one that allows for civil forfeiture, forfeiture was allowed 
in this case.69 Noticeably absent from the indictment is any reference to the non-
infringing content stored on Megaupload’s servers.70 In fact, the government 
almost certainly has no intention to “use” such files, which were stored at the 
direction of third party users, in its prosecution. While the FBI may not have 
deliberately seized the data of every single Megaupload user, their stored files 
nevertheless became collateral damage in the sweep. 
                                                          
63 International law enforcement agencies seize 706 domain names selling counterfeit 
merchandise, ICE, https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1312/131202washingtondc.htm (last modified 
Dec. 2, 2013). 
64 Ben Sisario, 7 Charged as F.B.I. Closes a Top File-Sharing Site, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/technology/indictment-charges-megaupload-site-with-piracy.html. 
65 Naomi Tajitsu, NZ court rules Megaupload warrant legal, dealing blow to Dotcom, REUTERS 
(Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/19/us-newzealand-megaupload-warrant-
idUSBREA1I02F20140219. 
66 Sisario, supra note 64. 
67 Indictment, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12CR3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012). 
68 18 U.S.C. § 81962(d) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 9371 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 71956(h) (2012); 18 
U.S.C. § 92319 (2012). 
69 18 U.S.C. § 2323 (2012). 
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Even legitimate users are prevented from accessing their stored data due to 
the FBI’s seizure of Megaupload’s domain names. One is example is that of Kyle 
Goodwin, a former Megaupload customer, who used the service to store videos of 
high school sporting events.71 Goodwin’s small business used Megaupload to store 
and distribute these video files.72 After the FBI’s seizure, Goodwin filed a motion 
in the Eastern District of Virginia seeking the return of his property.73 According to 
Goodwin, his personal hard drive crashed just days before federal authorities shut 
down the service.74 As a result, Goodwin’s non-infringing video files are presently 
stored somewhere among the 25 million gigabytes of data rendered inaccessible by 
the actions of the United States Government.75 
The sheer magnitude of users and files, which have been implicated in the 
Megaupload seizure, aptly illustrates the dichotomy between the forfeiture of 
physical assets and the forfeiture of digital assets. This case also reveals that the 
CAFRA reforms are of limited benefit when digital assets are at issue. For 
example, although the Act requires that counsel be made available to indigent 
claimants,76 aggrieved property owners such as Goodwin are unlikely to qualify. 
This is because Goodwin does not have an ownership interest in the seized property 
(Megaupload’s domain names) and therefore does not have standing to challenge 
the forfeiture.77 
Civil forfeitures are a tool of convenience for law enforcement, allowing them 
to seize first and ask questions later. The burden is then placed on the owner of the 
property to come into court and contest the forfeiture.78 This system is no longer 
practicable when digital assets are involved, because many Internet services have a 
user base that is geographically spread across multiple continents. Although our 
courts have clear jurisdictional limits, the Internet does not. Therefore, it is no 
longer rational to argue the government is justified in making broad seizures simply 
because innocent users may challenge them in a United States District Court. 
                                                          
71 David Kravets, Feds Say No Dice in Retrieving Your Data Seized in Megaupload Case, WIRED 





76 18 U.S.C. § 8983(b)(1) (2012). 
77 See 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(1) (2012). 
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Two years have passed since the initial Megaupload seizure and neither 
Goodwin nor any other user has been granted access to his or her non-infringing 
data.79 Megaupload’s hosting company has agreed to sell the leased servers to 
Megaupload for $1,000,000, but the government rejected the plan by refusing to 
unfreeze any of the company’s assets.80 The government continues to argue it is not 
financially or logistically able to return Goodwin’s property, and Goodwin should 
seek other remedies.81 Paradoxically, the government has requested a sealed ex 
parte order, which would allow them to share Megaupload’s data with copyright 
industry groups such as the MPAA.82 The government argues that such disclosure 
is necessary to ensure that copyright holders can bring civil lawsuits against 
Megaupload before the statute of limitations expires.83 
B. Silk Road 
For over two years, an underground website allowed visitors from across the 
world to buy and sell illegal drugs as easily as purchasing a book on 
Amazon.com.84 Silk Road’s revenue surpassed $22 million in its first year of 
operation.85 The FBI estimates that Ross Ulbricht, the website’s alleged owner and 
operator, obtained over $80 Million in commissions throughout his tenure.86 As a 
technical matter, Silk Road and its operators sold nothing.87 Rather, Silk Road was 
                                                          
79 Mike Masnick, US Court Secretly Lets Government Share Megaupload Evidence With 
Copyright Industry, TECHDIRT (Dec. 6, 2013, 7:39 PM), www.techdirt.com/articles/20131206/ 
02524925481/us-court-secretly-lets-government-share-megaupload-evidence-with-copyright-
industry.shtml. 
80 David Kravets, Feds Tell Megaupload Users to Forget About Their Data, WIRED (June 11, 
2012, 4:58 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/feds-megaupload-data. 
81 Id. 
82 Masnick, supra note 79. 
83 The position of the Department of Justice in this case seems to be that legitimate users are not 
entitled to the return of their data, but that Hollywood is entitled to a copy. See id. (providing a more 
thorough examination of the Government’s position). 
84 Andy Greenberg, Black Market Drug Site ‘Silk Road’ Booming: $22 Million In Annual Sales, 
FORBES (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/08/06/black-
market-drug-site-silk-road-booming-22-million-in-annual-mostly-illegal-sales. 
85 Id. 
86 Sealed Verified Complaint 4, United States v. Ulbricht, 13 Civ. 6919 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) 
[hereinafter Sealed Verified Complaint], available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-
courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2013cv06919/418116/4/0.pdf. 
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merely a marketplace, which connected buyers and sellers.88 For Silk Road’s 
trouble, they would retain a commission of 8–15% of the purchase price.89 
Even though Silk Road’s business model was somewhat analogous to services 
like eBay and Craigslist, Silk Road’s model was distinctive.90 Unlike other 
services, Silk Road’s home page was crowded with listings such as “10 x 10mg 
OxyContin” and “5G Pure Cocaine Cristal.”91 Silk Road was accessible only to 
visitors using Tor, a free piece of software that makes it theoretically impossible to 
trace a user’s genuine identity.92 Similarly, Silk Road did not accept credit cards, 
PayPal, or any other traditional forms of payment.93 All Silk Road transactions 
were secured with a digital currency called Bitcoin.94 Bitcoins are an anonymous, 
decentralized form of electronic currency that uses cryptography software to 
control their creation and transfer.95 
According to the FBI, Ulbricht made a series of calamitous slipups exposing 
his identity to federal agents who were, unsurprisingly, monitoring the site.96 On 
October 1, 2013, Silk Road’s walls came tumbling down. On that morning, the FBI 
took Ulbricht into custody at a public library in San Francisco.97 Ulbricht was 
performing administrative maintenance on the site when agents moved in.98 
Critically, the FBI sought to detain Ulbricht before he could close his laptop 
thereby preventing the collection of valuable evidence.99 Immediately after 
Ulbricht’s arrest, visitors to the Silk Road website were no longer greeted with a 
                                                          
88 Sealed Verified Complaint, supra note 86, at 4. 
89 Id. 
90 See Sealed Verified Complaint, supra note 86 (discussing the general nature of Silk Road’s 
business). 
91 Segal, supra note 87. 
92 Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). See also 
Sealed Verified Complaint, supra note 86, at 3. 
93 Segal, supra note 87. 
94 Greenberg, supra note 84. 
95 Sealed Complaint, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 13 Mag. 2328 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013). 
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marketplace of mind altering substances, but were instead redirected to a FBI 
seizure notice.100 
The FBI seized all Bitcoins, which remained in Silk Road user accounts, as 
well as Ulbricht’s personal stash of Bitcoins.101 On October 13, 2013, the United 
States posted a notice of forfeiture on its website at www.forfeiture.gov.102 Ulbricht 
subsequently filed a claim contesting the civil forfeiture of the Bitcoins found on 
his laptop.103 Ulbricht’s assertion is unsurprising considering the stockpile of 
Bitcoins seized has been valued at over $130 million.104 Not a single person, 
however, was daring enough to claim an ownership interest in any portion of the 
$28 million, which had previously been held in individual user accounts on the Silk 
Road.105 After District Judge J. Paul Oetken signed a final forfeiture order on 
January 15, 2014, the United States became the proud new owner of $28 million 
worth of allegedly tainted digital currency.106 
The law of civil asset forfeitures allowed the government to avoid the 
impossible task of identifying each and every Silk Road user and subsequently 
demonstrating criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.107 The government 
was largely able turn a blind eye to the actual owners of the $28 million because 
the Bitcoins were viewed as defendants.108 The government’s allegation that the 
funds were involved in a money laundering conspiracy was therefore sufficient to 
                                                          
100 See id. 
101 Kashmir Hill, The Feds Are Ready To Sell $25 Million of Bitcoin Seized From The Silk Road, 
FORBES (Jan. 16, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/01/16/the-feds-are-
ready-to-sell-the-silk-road-bitcoin-kind-of. 
102 Partial Judgment by Default and Order of Forfeiture at 3, United States v. Ulbricht, No. 13 
Civ. 6919 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Partial Judgment by Default], available at 
http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2013cv06919/418116/19/0.pdf. 
103 Id. 
104 Press Release, The United States Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, 
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Forfeiture of $28 Million Worth of Bitcoins Belonging to Silk 
Road (Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Forfeiture], http://www.justice 
.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/SilkRoadForfeiture.php. 
105 Partial Judgment by Default, supra note 102, at 3. 
106 Id. at 4. 
107 As of July 23, 2013, there were 957,079 registered user accounts on Silk Road. See Lorenzo 
Franceschi-Bicchierai, The Silk Road Online Drug Marketplace by the Numbers, MASHABLE (Oct. 4, 
2013, 12:00 PM), http://mashable.com/2013/10/04/silk-road-by-the-numbers. 
108 See United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 668 n.16 (4th Cir. 2003) (“civil forfeiture 
proceedings are brought against property, not against the property owner; the owner’s culpability is 
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justify forfeiture.109 This notion is a complex legal fiction designed to provide the 
means to an end. The forfeiture action essentially obscures its real impetus, 
preventing the purchase and sale of controlled substances on the Internet,110 by 
pretending that the Bitcoins themselves were “an essential component” of 
Ulbricht’s alleged money laundering conspiracy (a charge for which Ulbricht is 
presumed innocent).111 
The government’s initial forfeiture complaint artfully refers to the goods and 
services offered on Silk Road as “overwhelmingly illegal.”112 The most in-depth 
analysis of the Silk Road ever conducted found that 955 items, or 3.9% of all 
listings, were categorized as “books.”113 These items are unlikely to constitute 
contraband.114 More importantly, the First Amendment protects them.115 Yet, the 
government did not trouble itself with distinguishing users who had purchased 
books from users who had purchased heroin.116 The government simply seized all 
user funds without any further inquiry.117 The Silk Road forfeiture is an excellent 
example of the power of our existing civil asset forfeiture regime. 
The Silk Road forfeiture further demonstrates that the money laundering 
statute provides an effective means for federal prosecutors to forfeit assets, because 
it eliminates the need to distinguish between the portion of the property traceable to 
the underlying offense and the portion derived from other sources.118 In fact, the 
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York has joyfully 
conceded: 
                                                          
109 See Partial Judgment by Default, supra note 102. 
110 See Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Forfeiture, supra note 104. 
111 Partial Judgment by Default, supra note 102, at 3. 
112 Sealed Verified Complaint, supra note 86, at 6. 
113 See Nicolas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large Anonymous 
Online Marketplace, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/nicolasc/ 
publications/TR-CMU-CyLab-12-018.pdf (last modified Nov. 28, 2012). 
114 Id. 
115 U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (“The right of 
freedom of speech . . . embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to 
receive it.”). 
116 See Partial Judgment by Default, supra note 102. 
117 Id. 
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[w]e continue our efforts to take the profit out of crime 
and signal to those who would turn to the dark web for 
illicit activity that they have chosen the wrong path. . . . 
The Silk Road hidden website was designed to enable its 
users to buy and sell illegal drugs and other unlawful 
goods and services anonymously and beyond the reach 
of law enforcement.119 
The clash between reality and legal fiction is blatant in this statement. In the 
courtroom, the government forfeited these assets because they were an essential 
component of a money-laundering scheme.120 In its press release, however, the 
Department of Justice openly congratulates itself for seizing $28 million from 
persons engaged in the purchase and sale of controlled substances via the 
Internet.121 
While the United States government should not be rebuked for its efforts to 
enforce the Controlled Substances Act, the fact that the government has 
accomplished its ends by sacrificing the rights of potentially innocent persons is 
concerning. Given that so many persons were impacted by the Silk Road’s 
forfeiture, at least one innocent person had assets improperly forfeited. In fact, one 
individual, Peter Ward, a head shop owner from Devon, England, claims exactly 
that by asserting that his assets were seized even though he used Silk Road for 
exclusively legal transactions.122 Unsurprisingly, Ward would like his profits 
returned to him, which total approximately $95,000.123 Ward has even retained an 
attorney and hopes to delay the government’s auction of his property.124 If Kyle 
Goodwin’s attempts to reclaim his data from Megaupload’s servers are any 
indication, Ward’s legal battle may prove to be the ultimate exercise in futility. 
Still, he remains optimistic and proclaims that “[i]t will be cool if an old hippy can 
throw a spanner in the big FBI machine.”125 
                                                          
119 Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Forfeiture, supra note 104. 
120 Partial Judgment by Default, supra note 102, at 3. 
121 Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Forfeiture, supra note 104. 
122 Andy Greenberg, Silk Road Vendor Fighting To Reclaim Seized Bitcoins, Argues He Sold 
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IV. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the taking of 
private property for public use, without just compensation.126 The Takings Clause 
provides: “[n]or shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation.”127 This guarantee “was designed to bar government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should 
be borne by the public as a whole.”128 It is useful to note the widespread doctrinal 
uncertainty surrounding the Takings Clause.129 This confusion has led one scholar 
to comment “[t]hroughout constitutional jurisprudence, only the right of privacy 
can compete seriously with takings law for the doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-
a-principle prize.”130 Similarly, the Supreme Court has conceded “[t]his Court in 
the past has recognized the difficulty of reconciling the broad scope of traditional 
forfeiture doctrine with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.”131 
Just compensation is required whenever the government’s activities, however 
legitimate, interfere with the use of private property, such that it is effectively taken 
from its owner for a public use.132 Even though it can be argued that every 
government action to some degree is intended to benefit the public and that the 
public derives some benefit from the enforcement of our criminal statutes, one 
recent case clearly contradicts this argument. In AmeriSource Corp. v. United 
States,133 the government seized over $150,000 worth of AmeriSource’s 
pharmaceuticals from a Norfolk Pharmacy (Norfolk) warehouse.134 The United 
States Attorney ordered the seizure pursuant to an investigation into two of 
Norfolk’s principals, who had been indicted for operating an unregistered drug 
                                                          
126 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. 
127 Id. 
128 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
129 See e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977) (“I 
have not encountered a single lawyer, judge, or scholar who views existing case-law as anything but a 
chaos of confused argument which ought to be set right if one only knew how”). See also Richard L. 
Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now You Don’t, 12 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 339, 339 (“Regulatory taking doctrine is the most perplexing area of American land use 
law.”). 
130 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277, 278 (2001). 
131 United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721 (1971). 
132 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–83 (2005); Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
133 AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
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facility.135 The government never initiated forfeiture proceedings against 
AmeriSource, nor did they introduce AmeriSource’s drugs into evidence at the 
criminal trial that led to the convictions of Norfolk’s principals.136 Rather, the 
pharmaceuticals were held in storage and rendered worthless due to the passage of 
their expiration dates.137 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
rejected AmeriSource’s contention that the government’s decision to retain the 
drugs beyond the point of expiration constituted a taking.138 Specifically, the court 
reasoned “[p]roperty seized and retained pursuant to the police power is not taken 
for a ‘public use’ in the context of the Takings Clause.”139 
This reasoning is questionable in light of well-established Supreme Court 
precedent that broadly defines public use.140 The court’s attempt to draw a bright 
line between police power and public use is similarly dubious.141 The Supreme 
Court has “long ago rejected any literal requirement that . . . property be put into 
use for the general public.”142 The Federal Circuit’s contention that the valid 
exercise of a state’s police power is not a “public use” also ignores the fact that 
regulatory takings have, on occasion, gone so far as to require just compensation.143 
Accordingly, AmeriSource Corp. should not be read to preclude the possibility that 
an overbroad cyber seizure may implicate the takings clause. 
V. POLICY AND CONCLUSION 
Treating digital asset forfeitures as Fifth Amendment takings would 
incentivize the government to act with a scalpel rather than a sword. Such an 
approach would ensure that seizures in cyberspace are conducted narrowly rather 
                                                          
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1151. 
137 Id. 
138 AmeriSource, 525 F.3d at 1153. 
139 Id. 
140 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Public safety, public health, morality, peace 
and quiet, law and order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional 
application of the police power[]. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit 
it.”). 
141 See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1984) (holding that public use is 
“coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers”). 
142 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. at 481–82 (quoting 467 U.S. at 235, 241–42, 244). 
143 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at 
least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
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than carelessly. Broad seizures would only be executed when they could survive a 
cost-benefit analysis. While some critics may argue that this approach would 
unduly impede law enforcement, the logic of the law enforcement impediment 
argument rings hollow. As certain costs and benefits will always accompany 
criminal investigations, the question should not be what costs are associated with 
the criminal investigation, but whether those costs should be borne by a select 
number of innocent individuals or by the public as a whole. The current system is 
unfair to property owners and promotes the use of investigative tactics whose costs 
to the innocent far outweigh their benefits to the public. Just as the government 
must pay for land on which it builds courthouses and prisons,144 it too should be 
required to pay for the property it destroys while investigating and prosecuting 
crime. 
Once warned of the abuse that would follow from forfeiture schemes that 
bestowed upon the government virtually unlimited authority to seize private 
property, the Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen such application shall be made it 
will be time enough to pronounce upon it.”145 Surely that time has arrived when the 
government may deprive 60 million users of access to their own property or seize 
$28 million from persons whom it has not even identified.146 These two cases 
illustrate the problematic nature of employing existing law enforcement tools in 
cyberspace. The problems that have plagued civil asset forfeiture since its inception 
have only become more evident as the government attempts to blur the line 
between physical and intangible property. 
The rhetoric and policies of the 1970s were, and still remain, utterly 
counterproductive. Not only did these policies fail to accomplish their stated 
objectives, but also in the process ignited our tendency to pursue only penal 
solutions to social problems. Moderate reforms over the last decade have brought 
an end to a few of the imprudent policies.147 By any objective measure, these 
                                                          
144 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–83 (2005). 
145 Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 512 (1921). 
146 Partial Judgment by Default, supra note 102, at 3. 
147 See, e.g., President Obama Signs Bill Reducing Cocaine Sentencing Disparity, ACLU, 
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May 14, 2009, 12:01 AM) (discussing several of the laws previously enacted during our nation’s 40-
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policies have been a failure.148 Fittingly, many elected officials, and countless 
ordinary Americans, have called for an end to the drug war.149 The armistice, 
however, will come far too late because many of the most precarious law 
enforcement tools—born of the 1970s war-on-crime mentality—has already spread 
like a cancer. 
Even though civil asset forfeitures are now deeply rooted in our national 
strategy to combat cybercrime,150 the courts should limit the threat of twenty-first 
century criminal investigations by preventing complete disregard for the property 
rights of blameless Internet users in digital asset forfeitures. The solution is not 
novel—it was written into our nation’s most fundamental declaration of individual 
rights by James Madison 225 years ago. In pursuit of the well-established ideal that 
certain burdens should, “in all fairness and justice,” be borne by the public as a 
whole, courts should classify digital asset forfeitures as Fifth Amendment 
takings.151 
                                                          
148 Jacob Sullum, The Wasteful War On Drugs Is Doomed By Economics 101, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2013/10/04/the-wasteful-war-on-drugs-is-doomed-by-
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149 But see GEORGE SANTAYANA, SOLILOQUIES IN ENGLAND AND LATER SOLILOQUIES 102 
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150 See Exec. Office of the President, Strategy To Combat Transnational Organized Crime: 
Addressing Converging Threats to National Security 20 (July 19, 2011), available at 
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